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Introduction
This note is in response to Ali (2013, EB) on the substitution of finance and institutions in prospects of private investment. We relax his hypotheses on the conception, definition and measurement of finance and institutions because they are less realistic to developing countries to which the resulting policy implications are destined. Indeed the paper concludes that the findings are more relevant to developing countries which inherently have poor financial systems: "This note presents evidence which shows that PRI and FD promote private 
investment in developing countries. More importantly, the analysis indicates that the impact of PRI on investment varies with the level of financial sector development, such that a strong PRI increase private investment especially in countries where the financial system is either missing or inadequate. On the contrary, well-functioning financial systems do not seem to increase the beneficial effect of property rights on investment. We postulate that this is so because well-functioning institutions can perform similar functions to sophisticated financial systems including the reduction of information and transaction costs and thereby enhance
private investment in the absence of well developed financial sectors" (Ali, 2013 (Ali, , p. 1129 .
In light of the above, we discuss four main shortcomings in the underlying paper with respect to developing countries: absence of an inherent nexus between the financial development measurement and private investment; context of the conception and measurement of financial development dynamics in developing countries; periodicity for relevance of policy implications and; measurement of property rights institutions (PRI).
First, we argue that contrary to Ali (2013) , the intuition on a potential nexus between financial development and private investment should not be based on financial system deposits. Accordingly, deposits must be transformed into credit for economic operators in order to be materialized into private investments. The financial systems of developing countries are substantially suffering from surplus liquidity (deposit) issues. The excess liquidity concerns in African financial systems have been substantially documented in recent financial development literature (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2011; 2012a; 2013a,b,c; 2014a,b) . In light of the above, the nexus between deposits and private investment as provided by Ali (2013) may hypothetically not support his conclusions in African countries where deposits cannot easily be transformed into credit for economic operators.
Second, because the financial system maybe inadequate in developing countries (as per the conclusion of Ali), a great chunk of the monetary base may not transit through the formal financial system as deposits. Hence, using only financial system deposits to appreciate the levels of financial development in less developed countries inherently presents variable omission issues. We address this concern by employing all the dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB). These include: financial depth (at overall economic and financial system levels); financial efficiency (from banking system and financial system perspectives), financial activity (at banking system and financial system levels) and financial size. In essence, the 'substitution of finance and institutions in investment' could be in the perspectives of financial dynamics of depth, allocation efficiency, activity and size.
Third, the intuition of using an updated dataset is threefold. (1) The 1970 to 1999 period used by Ali (2013) may not be the best periodicity to capture 'property rights institutions' (PRI) in developing countries. We argue that PRI were for the most part imposed on developing countries during second generation reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions (Asongu, 2014c; . Hence, consistent with recent openness literature (Asongu, 2013bde) , a 1996-2010 sample period is more appropriate 2 . (2) The use of an 2 In the 1980s and 1990s, most developing countries embarked on a plethora of policy initiatives at financial and institutional levels with the objective of given impetus to economic prosperity through financial allocation efficiency and investment opportunities (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992) . First generation reforms entailed inter alia, the following policies: allowing of interests rates to be market determined; relaxing of control on international capital movements; abolishing explicit control on the pricing and allocation of credit; relaxing of control on updated dataset provides findings with more updated and focused policy implications. (3) The use of five-year data averages by the underlying study also presents one main shortcoming:
post 1990 second generation institutional and financial reforms are captured only by two periods.
Fourth, the use of Polity IV to appreciate PRI is somehow lacking in substance. While Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) are used by the author to justify the choice, we argue that the indicator is only limited to political governance. Consistent with recent property rights literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013, p. 671-672) , PRI entail a plethora of governance mechanisms. Therefore, we complement Polity IV with a composite indicator of political (political stability and voice & accountability), economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional (rule of law and corruption-control) governance.
Drawing from the above, the present note assesses the three main hypotheses of Ali (2013).
Hypothesis 1: The incidence of finance on private investment is positively significant.
Hypothesis 2: The effect of PRI on private investment is also positively significant.
Hypothesis 3: The interaction of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 on private investment is negative implying that the positive effects are stronger in countries with poorer and/or inadequate financial systems.
The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and outlines the methodology. Empirical results and discussion are covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with policy recommendations.
international capital movements and; reducing direct government intervention in bank credit decisions. On the other hand, reforms of the second generation focused on institutional and structural constraints, among others: improvement of the regulatory, supervisory, legal and institutional environments; restoration of bank soundness and; rehabilitation of financial infrastructure Asongu, 2013bd) .
Data and Methodology

Data
We examine a sample of 53 African countries with annual data from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) for the period 1996 to 2010. Limitations to the scope of countries and periodicity of analysis have a threefold justification. First, the African continent for the most part consists of poor countries with inadequate financial systems. Hence, this positioning is consistent with the hypotheses from the findings of Ali (2013) . Second, constraints in data availability on institutional quality, since government quality indicators of the WB only date from 1996. Third, the motivation of capturing second generation reforms (which targeted institutional constraints) for more focused and updated policy implications.
Private investment and financial development dynamics
Consistent with Ali (2013) we measure private investment as a proportion of GDP. In addition to financial depth, we extend the underlying study by presenting the 'substitution of finance and institutions in investment' in financial perspectives of allocation efficiency, activity and size. Moreover, we complement the existing measurement of financial system depth (deposits) with overall economic depth (money supply) that integrates the informal financial sector.
Firstly, from a financial depth perspective we appreciate financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system dimensions with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. The monetary base (M0) plus demand, saving and time deposits constitute the former whereas liquid liabilities (or deposits) make-up the latter.
Secondly, in line with underpinnings discussed in the introduction, financial efficiency measures the ability of deposits (money) to be transformed into credit for private investment purposes. This second indicator appreciates the fundamental mission of financial institutions in transforming mobilized deposits into credit for private investment. We account for both banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively 'bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd' and 'financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd').
Thirdly, financial activity is measured in terms of credit. This further emphasizes the ability of banks to grant credit for private investment purposes. We proxy for both for financial-system-activity and banking-system-activity with "private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof" and "private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb" respectively.
Fourthly, financial system size is measured in terms of deposit bank assets (credit) as a proportion of total assets (deposit bank assets plus central bank assets). The correlation analyses presented in Appendix 2 show that (but for financial size) the two indicators adopted for each financial dynamic can be used to robustly check the other, owing to their high degrees of substitution (correlation).
Property rights institutions (PRI) and control variables
The baseline PRI is the Polity IV as employed by Ali (2013) and justified with Acemoglu & Johnson (2005 
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis
In line with Asongu (2013b) , due to the high degree of substitution (correlation) among various governance variables, there is redundancy of some information. Therefore we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of political, economic and institutional governance. PCA is a widely used statistical method to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal component (PC) that reflect most of the information in the original dataset. Hence, the objective is to reduce six governance indicators (government-effectiveness, political stability, corruptioncontrol, rule of law, regulation quality, and voice & accountability) into a single variable.
In the decision of which PC to retain for common factors, the criteria used is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) . They advise that only PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one should be selected. As presented in Table 1 below, the first PC is appropriate since it has an eigenvalue of 4.642 and summarizes more than 77% of information in the combined institutional indicators. Hence, the retained first PC will represent our institutional index (Instidex). 
Estimation Technique
To ensure consistency, the estimation strategy is the same as in Ali (2013) .
Accordingly, when compared with other cross-country analysis, dynamic panel data estimation has many advantages (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; Asongu, 2013b) . The dynamic panel regression model in first difference is presented as follows:
Where 't' represents the period and 'i' stands for a country. PI is private investment; F , financial development (depth, efficiency, activity or size); PRI , property rights institutions (Polity IV or Institutional index); FPRI , interaction between finance (F) and property rights institutions (PRI); T , trade openness; E , economic prosperity; I , inflation; i  is a countryspecific effect; t  is a time-specific constant and;
 an error term. Between the system GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) and the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) , we go for the former with respect to Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) . In the specification of the estimations, the two-step GMM approach is preferred to the one-step approach because it corrects for heteroscedasticity. We use three year non-overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run disturbances and control for the issue of instrument proliferation in GMM estimations. Hence, the basic condition for using GMM estimation is met: N>T (53>5). Moreover, the instruments are substantially lower than the number of crosssections.
In summary, the principal arguments for dynamic system GMM estimation are that it: controls for the potential endogeneity in all the regressors, mitigates potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples and, does not eliminate cross-country variation (Asongu, 2013f) .
Empirical analysis and discussion of results
This section assesses three main issues: (1) the incidence of financial dynamics and institutions on private investment; (2) the substitution of financial dynamics and institutions in private investment and; (3) the validity of (1) and (2) when an institutional index (Instidex) is used in place of Polity IV in the measurement of PRI. While Section 3.1 deals with the firsttwo concerns (Tables 2-3) , the third issue is assessed in Section 3.2 (Tables 4-5 ). The validity of the models by means of the Sargan OIR and AR(2) tests are broadly confirmed since their null hypotheses are not overwhelmingly rejected 3 .
Updated financial dynamics and baseline PRI measurement
Tables 2-3 below assess the Ali (2013) hypotheses using financial dynamics and the baseline PRI measurement (Polity IV). While Table 2 reports financial dynamics of depth and efficiency, Table 3 is concerned with financial dynamics of activity and size. Panel A(B) of Table 2 report's findings of financial depth (efficiency) whereas Panel A(B) of Table 3 shows results of financial activity (size).
But for the positive effect of financial size on private investment in Panel B of Table   3 , the Ali (2013) hypotheses are overwhelmingly rejected under the assumption of financial dynamics with the baseline PRI measurement. In essence, the following could be established.
(1) All the financial dynamics and PRI estimates have the expected signs. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.
Updated financial dynamics and modified PRI measurement
Tables 4-5 below assess the third issue outlined in the introduction of Section 3.
Accordingly, the three hypotheses of the introduction are examined using financial development dynamics and a modified PRI measurement (institutional index). Whereas Table   4 reports financial dynamics of depth and efficiency, Table 5 is concerned with financial dynamics of activity and size. Panel A(B) of Table 4 report's findings of financial depth (efficiency) whereas Panel A(B) of Table 5 shows results of financial activity (size).
One similarity and one difference emerge from the second scenario. The former is a positive effect of financial size on private investment in Panel B of Table 5 while 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.
We briefly discuss the differences in results with respect to tested hypotheses in three main strands: the nexus between financial dynamics and private investment (Hypothesis 1); the relationship between Polity IV and private investment (Hypothesis 2) and; the relevance of the interaction effect (Hypothesis 3).
First, on Hypothesis 1 the overwhelming absence of positive nexuses among financial dynamics (depth, efficiency and activity) and private investment could be explained by the substantially documented surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009) . Financial allocation efficiency could also be appreciated as the ratio of financial depth (deposits and/or money) to financial activity (credit for investment). Hence, the low allocation efficiency also implies low financial activity and high financial depth. On the other hand, the significant positive effect of financial size is not unexpected since it is broadly consistent with recent African finance literature. In comparison to financial dynamics of depth, activity and efficiency, financial size has been found to be the most significantly sensitive to economic activity (Asongu, 2013g, 2014a .
Second, Hypothesis 2 is only partially valid. PRI as measured by Polity IV (Institutional index) insignificantly (significantly) improve private investment. The insignificant effect of Polity IV has a twofold explanation: the time and level hypotheses for the benefits of democracy. In line with Asongu (2012b) , the time and level hypotheses have been documented: in many countries in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972) , Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972) , India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977) ; post 1990 communist countries like Russia (Varsee, 1997) and: many Latin American countries upon different waves of democratization (Weyland, 1998) . 
Conclusion and policy recommendations
The Ali (2013, EB) findings on the nexuses among institutions, finance and investment could have an important influence on policy and academic debates. This paper relaxes his hypotheses on the conception, definition and measurement of finance and institutions because they are less realistic to developing countries to which the resulting policy implications are destined. We dissect with great acuteness the contextual underpinnings of financial development dynamics and elucidate why the Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) justification provided for the measurement of property rights institutions (PRI) is lacking in substance. Using updated data (1996 Using updated data ( -2010 from 53 African countries, we provide more robust evidence on the substitution of institutions and finance in investment. Results under many baseline and augmented scenarios are not consistent with the underlying paper.
Justifications for the differences in findings are discussed. As a policy implication: PRI should not be measured strictly from political governance; the context of financial development should be taken into account in the proxying of financial variables and; the Ali (2013) hypotheses for poor countries may not be relevant for Africa.
While it is indisputable that institutions are crucial for Africa's emergence (Fosu, 2013ab) , the measurement of PRI in terms of Polity IV has shortcomings. Whereas the drawbacks on which the note is positioned have already been discussed, it is relevant nonetheless to highlight how Africa is different from other regions of the World in relation to Polity IV which was originally designed as a measurement of political system durability and in later years broadened in terms of analytical scope to entail issues of regime type. In North Africa, the 2011 Arab Spring has not completely subsided. In Egypt, the conception and definition of democracy has been revised several times. Tunisia's transition is yet to fully Given that Polity IV is also an indicator for priority in political rights; the results go a long way to extending the debate of 'the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Model' on precedence between 'economic rights' and 'political rights' (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014d; Moyo, 2013) . Though an endogeneity robust empirical strategy has been employed, in light of the on-going debate, we are tempted to infer that issues of reverse causality may still be at play. Hence, Polity IV (political rights) could be more endogenous to private investment (economic rights). It is also important to note that the policy recommendations are not blanket, as issues of heterogeneity in countries like Botswana and Mauritius may be apparent. 
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